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Shaun McCutcheon contributed almost half a million dollars in
campaign finance money over the last three years but wanted to contribute
still more. In the 2011–2012 election cycle alone, he contributed to sixteen
federal candidates, all three national Republican Party committees, and
several other political action committees (PACs).1 Nonetheless, he wanted
to contribute money to at least a dozen more candidates and even more to
the Republican Party committees. The problem for McCutcheon is that the
additional $100,000 that he wished to donate would have exceeded the
federal aggregate contribution limit that capped the total amount an
individual could contribute during that federal election cycle at $117,000.2
In a case popularly billed as the next Citizens United,3 McCutcheon
challenged this aggregate limit under the First Amendment,4 and if
successful, he and other wealthy individuals will be free to donate almost
$4 million in campaign finance contributions each election cycle.
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1
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136 (D.D.C. 2012). Of course, all his contributions
complied with the base contribution limits that cap the maximum contribution to a candidate and the
maximum contribution to a political committee. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (2012).
2
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(B) (2012); Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure
Limits and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 76 Fed. Reg. 8368, 8369–70 (Feb. 14, 2011). The
aggregate limit is now set at $123,200 for the 2013–2014 federal election cycle, and comprises
aggregate sublimits on contributions to candidates and contributions to political committees. One may
not contribute an aggregate total of more than $48,600 to federal candidates, subject to the individual
contribution limit of $2600 per candidate, during the 2013–2014 cycle, and no more than an aggregate
total of $74,600 to other political committees. The latter aggregate total of $74,600 itself contains
another sublimit of $48,600 in contributions to committees other than the national party committees.
Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling
Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530, 8532 (Feb. 6, 2013); Press Release, FEC, FEC Announces
2013–2014 Campaign Cycle Contribution Limits (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/
press/press2013/20133001_2013-14ContributionLimits.shtml.
3
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Again Weighs Spending Limits in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/politics/supreme-court-weighs-campaigncontribution-limits.html; Trevor Potter, The Supreme Court Needs to Get Smarter About Politics, WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-supreme-court-needs-to-getsmarter-about-politics/2013/10/11/806c9c44-31b7-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html.
4
McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
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The irony in McCutcheon v. FEC is that the Supreme Court is likely to
strike down all or a substantial part of the aggregate limit without
considering a government interest that provides the strongest plausible case
for the limit’s purpose. Ostensibly, all the litigants seem to agree that the
government purpose for the aggregate limit is anti-circumvention of the
base contribution limits. That is, the aggregate limit prevents an individual
from circumventing the base limit on contributions to a particular candidate
by barring the individual from donating large sums to other candidates or
political committees who could then funnel those sums back to the original
candidate. By capping the total amount an individual can contribute, the
aggregate limit indirectly restricts the use of third-party conduits to fund a
candidate beyond the base contribution limit. However, this rickety
rationale does not capture the larger intuitive appeal of the aggregate limit,
nor its most salient anti-corruption purpose.
The bedrock of campaign finance regulation’s constitutionality is the
government’s interest in the prevention of actual and apparent quid pro quo
corruption. Traditionally, corruption has been understood as arising
between a contributor and a candidate, with only a candidate positioned to
offer quids in exchange for money by virtue of the candidate’s access to
public office. But that myopic understanding of quid pro quo corruption as
limited to individual candidates, each isolated from one another, makes
little sense given the pervasiveness of political parties in national politics
and campaign finance. The major parties today cannot be understood as
separate from candidates and officeholders, but are constituted at their core
by an alliance of candidates and officeholders who coordinate policymaking
and campaign finance. The aggregate limit thus plausibly addresses the risk
of quid pro quo corruption, not between the traditional dyad of high-level
contributors and candidates, but between those contributors and political
parties.
Individual candidates and officeholders are hardly independent of each
other in any important sense, and the risk of quid pro quo corruption is
analytically little different for a cartel of candidates and officeholders than
it is for individuals.5 The aggregate limit caps the total volume of campaign
finance money that a high-level individual contributor can transact with a

5

Solicitor General Donald Verrilli captured this intuition, almost in passing, in the following
description of party campaign finance during the McCutcheon oral argument:
[E]very candidate in the party is going to be affected by [party campaign finance] because every
candidate is going to get a slice of the money, and every candidate is going to know that this
person who wrote the multimillion dollar check has helped, not only the candidate, but the whole
team, and that creates a particular sense of indebtedness.
And, of course, every member of the party . . . every officeholder in the party is likely to be leaned
on by the party leadership to deliver legislation to the people who are buttering their bread.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–40, McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-536 (U.S. argued Oct. 8, 2013)
[hereinafter McCutcheon Oral Argument], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/12-536_21o2.pdf.
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party or a party-based subgroup, much in the same way that base
contribution limits cap the volume of money that the contributor can
transact with a specific candidate. Understanding the aggregate limit
through this lens as a structural check on party-based, group-level
corruption better captures the corruption unease about an individual
contributor donating close to $4 million per federal election cycle and better
comports with the constitutional law of campaign finance regulation than
the anti-circumvention interest that dominated the McCutcheon case.
In truth, the type of group-level quid pro quo corruption that this Essay
contemplates is less party corruption than party-based corruption.
Substantive capture of an entire major party would be difficult given the
sheer scale of the parties and multiplicity of interests they serve. However,
the larger point is that politics is mediated pervasively by party linkages—
interconnecting individual candidates and officeholders—and these linkages
belie an assumption that corruption is conceivable only at the level of the
individual candidate. While the traditional notion of quid pro quo
corruption imagines only the individual contributor–candidate dyad,
candidates and officeholders publicly coordinate in party and subparty blocs
on both campaign finance and lawmaking—both sides of the potential
corruption ledger.
Of course, this case for the constitutionality of the aggregate limit does
not mean the limit is ideal public policy. We might not like its
discouragement of contributions to candidates and parties vis-a-vis outside
groups like Super PACs.6 We might prefer that the aggregate limit be set
higher or lower based on what we estimate the risk of group-level
corruption. As far as this Essay goes, such considerations are largely
legislative matters for Congress to decide. The point is that the Court was
not faced with the most intuitive case for the aggregate limit’s
constitutionality. Even if the Court strikes down the aggregate limit in
McCutcheon, supporters of new substitute reforms might consider
advancing constitutional rationales based on the sort of group-level
corruption concerns articulated here, particularly if and when the Court’s
membership changes again.
I. MCCUTCHEON AND ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION
Federal law imposes an aggregate contribution limit on individual
contributors in addition to the familiar recipient-specific limits. The
recipient-specific contribution limits cap the amount that any individual
may donate to a particular recipient—candidate, party, or other political
committee—for a single election. The aggregate limit and associated
sublimits are less known but cap the total amount that an individual may
donate during a single election cycle collectively to all candidates. For the
2013–2014 election cycle, the aggregate limit is $123,200, with no more
6

See infra note 42.
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than $48,600 of that limit allocated to candidates and no more than $74,600
allocated to political parties and other political committees.7 The
constitutionality of this aggregate limit is the question at bar in McCutcheon
v. FEC.
The three-judge district court below upheld the aggregate limit based
on an anti-circumvention theory.8 The court reasoned that the aggregate
limit ensured that an individual could not indirectly contribute through a
conduit more to a particular recipient than the recipient-specific base
contribution limit permits.9 The court explained that a contributor could
have made a $500,000 donation to a joint fundraising committee, which
might have in turn transferred the full amount to a single party committee.10
This half-million dollar donation would have exceeded the then-permissible
$30,800 limit applicable to the federal party committees and $10,000 limit
applicable to state and local party committees.11 This type of circumvention
is frustrated by an aggregate limit that caps the amount that an individual
could give any recipient, therefore confining the total amount of money that
could be re-distributed down the line.
The magic of this anti-circumvention theory, according to the limit’s
supporters, is that it comports with the restrictive definition of corruption
that emerged from Citizens United v. FEC.12 The decision in Citizens
United struck down federal prohibitions on corporate electioneering based
largely on its reasoning that only direct contributions from donor to
recipient, or otherwise coordinated exchanges, produce the type of
transaction that gives rise to a risk of quid pro quo corruption.13 Only the
risk of quid pro quo corruption, or the appearance thereof, the Court seemed
to indicate in Citizens United, permits the government to regulate campaign
finance under the First Amendment.14 This conception of quid pro quo
corruption connects with the anti-circumvention theory in McCutcheon. The
anti-circumvention theory, consistent with Citizens United, envisions a
dyadic relationship of potential corruption between a donor and recipient,
which the government may regulate by limiting the amount of money that
can be transferred between the two. While base contribution limits cap the
amount a contributor can give directly to a single recipient, the aggregate
limit constrains the amount a contributor might be able to give to the same
recipient indirectly through other conduits.

7

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 138–42.
9
See id. at 140.
10
Id.
11
See id.
12
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
13
See id. at 359–61.
14
See id. at 359.
8
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However, at the threshold, the aggregate limit serves this purpose only
by prohibiting any further federal candidate and party contributions,
regardless of recipient. Of course, the aggregate limit prevents any money
beyond the maximum amount from leaking back to candidates for whom a
particular donor has already tapped the base limit. But the aggregate limit
prevents the donor from giving to other recipients even when there seems
no risk of circumvention. The cost of achieving anti-circumvention through
the aggregate limit thus imposes some First Amendment costs. As Bob
Bauer put it, “Most contributions are made specifically to someone or some
entity, and the limit on contributions decreases the risk of corrupting that
particular someone or entity[,] . . . [while] [t]he overall limit might seem
more like a ceiling on spending.”15 It indiscriminately prevents
contributions to candidates and parties beyond the aggregate maximum that
otherwise would comply with the applicable base limits, at least for a small
group of wealthy donors who otherwise would continue to give.16 The
Center for Responsive Politics found 646 people in the 2012 federal
election cycle who tapped the then-current aggregate limit of $117,000.17
This group gave a total of $93.4 million directly to federal candidates and
committees.18 In the absence of an aggregate limit, those donors each would
be free to contribute more than $3.6 million to a major party’s committees
and its candidates for a single election cycle by giving the maximum
contributions to the party committees and every one of the party’s federal
candidates.19
Supporters of campaign finance regulation subtly touted suppression of
campaign spending as a benefit of the aggregate limit, but the constitutional
problem is that the bare purpose of capping aggregate spending by
individuals extends beyond the conception of quid pro quo corruption
articulated in Citizens United. The Court there framed quid pro quo
corruption as essentially dyadic, between a particular donor and recipient.20
The base limits address the risk of quid pro quo corruption inherent in a
contribution by limiting the money involved. This makes sense because the
potential for undue influence increases as the amount of money given to a
particular recipient increases. However, the aggregate limit prohibits
15

Bob Bauer, The McCutcheon Case and the Contribution/Expenditure Limit Problem, MORE SOFT
MONEY HARD L. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/04/contributions-andexpenditures-in-campaign-finance-jurisprudence.
16
See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1917–18
(2013) (providing examples of motivated billionaires who financed presidential campaigns with eightfigure commitments).
17
Bob Biersack, McCutcheon’s Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, OPENSECRETS
(Sept. 17, 2013, 11:38 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheons-multiplying-effectwhy.html.
18
Id.
19
See Brief of the Campaign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 6,
McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-536 (U.S. July 25, 2013).
20
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356–61 (2010).
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contributions to a recipient at the maximum not because the donor has
already given a large amount to that recipient, but because the donor has
given a large amount to other recipients. Under a dyadic conception of
corruption, there is little logic in regulating the relationship between the
donor and the recipient through an aggregate limit based on what that donor
has transacted with other recipients outside that relationship. For instance,
the aggregate limit allows a donor to make seventeen maximum candidate
contributions, but does not quite allow an eighteenth that would put the
donor over the limit. As Shaun McCutcheon himself argued, it is illogical to
assume that the eighteenth candidate would be more likely to be corrupted
by a $2600 contribution than the seventeenth candidate who just legally
received the same amount.21 It is unclear why, under a dyadic conception of
corruption, the earlier contributions under the aggregate limit are
permissible, but the later ones that would violate the aggregate limit are not.
Of course, the government’s position in McCutcheon is that,
hypothetically, the donor’s eighteenth maximum contribution could wind its
way back to the seventeenth recipient, in which case its prohibition does
relate to the preceding contributions.22 However, as several Justices
expressed during oral argument, this risk of circumvention seems uncertain
and empirically unestablished.23 In the constitutional parlance, aggregate
limits may not be sufficiently tailored to the government interest in anticircumvention. There are other more direct means of regulating
circumvention through anti-earmarking and other types of prohibitions that
are far from foolproof but lead to less costly overinclusiveness.
II. PARTY CAMPAIGN FINANCE AT THE AGGREGATE LIMIT
The aggregate contribution limit sits uneasily with the traditional
candidate-based understanding of quid pro quo corruption, but a partybased understanding of money’s influence in politics, grounded in the
practice of modern campaign finance, helps clarify the plausible
anticorruption purposes of the aggregate limit. Viewed through a partybased understanding of campaign finance, the transacting counterparty for
the type of wealthy donor affected by the limit may be one of the major
parties or a party-based subgroup as a collective, rather than a particular
candidate.
The traditional dyadic conception of the relationship between
contributor and candidate almost entirely leaves out the regular role of the
major parties in campaign finance. It imagines quid pro quo corruption as a
bilateral exchange between the contributor advancing private interest on
21

Shaun McCutcheon, Op-Ed., Donation Caps Hurt Democracy, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2013, 9:56
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/mccutcheon-how-campaign-spending-caps-hurt-americandemocracy-97834.html.
22
See Brief for the Appellee at 35–39, McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-536 (U.S. July 18, 2013).
23
See, e.g., McCutcheon Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 35–42.
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one hand and the candidate on the other hand. The salience of this scenario
is exemplified in the corruption worry in Caperton v. Massey.24 There, the
Court found a risk of actual bias from Don Blankenship’s $3 million in
support of Brent Benjamin’s campaign for state supreme court justice.25 The
Court focused on what just as well could have been an isolated quid pro quo
exchange, actual or perceived, because the corruption worry in
constitutional law is limited to just this sort of trade as its core concern. The
Court never considered the larger partisan political context, nor would it
have been important to the Court’s constitutional analysis, but the
relationship between Blankenship and Benjamin was mediated by their
common Republican Party ties. A long-time Republican operative running
Benjamin’s campaign introduced the pair and helped orchestrate
Blankenship’s spending in support of Benjamin.26 Blankenship not only
funded Benjamin’s candidacy but also sponsored scores of Republican
candidates as part of GOP legislative and electoral initiatives to win the
state legislature.27
In today’s high-level campaign finance, the major parties play an
important brokering role in coordinating contributors and candidates. The
major parties are pervasively involved in American electoral politics at
virtually every level and branch of government. They nominate and help
elect candidates to public office who will advance the party’s shared
agenda. As part of that work, the major parties cultivate and maintain a
deep infrastructure of professional fundraisers, campaign finance lawyers,
and wealthy supporters who bring to bear modern campaign finance on
behalf of the party’s candidates.28 The major parties match up campaign
finance contributors with their candidates on an ongoing basis more
efficiently and effectively than candidates could accomplish individually.29
In my empirical work with Joanna Shepherd, we found that the influence of
the major parties is so critical that judicial campaign finance is predictably
associated with the preferred outcomes of contributors mainly in partisan
elections where the parties play a role and little or not at all in nonpartisan
elections.30 High-level campaign finance, particularly at the federal level
where the aggregate limit applies, runs through the major parties.
24

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
See id. at 2263.
26
See LAURENCE LEAMER, THE PRICE OF JUSTICE: A TRUE STORY OF GREED AND CORRUPTION
211–13 (2013).
27
See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign
Finance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1241–42 (2013).
28
See PETER L. FRANCIA ET AL., THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: INVESTORS,
IDEOLOGUES, AND INTIMATES (2003); PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING
AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON (5th ed. 2008).
29
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 27, at 1241–42; Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The
Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 109 (2011).
30
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 27, at 1275–85; Kang & Shepherd, supra note 29, at 111–19.
25
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The major parties aggressively court and cater to the type of dedicated
high-level donor who hits the aggregate contribution limit. The political
lives of contributors such as Don Blankenship and Shaun McCutcheon are
tied up with their respective major party. The Republican National
Committee itself is a co-plaintiff with McCutcheon in his lawsuit, and the
very idea for the case appears to have been conceived at the 2012
Conservative Political Action Conference, a Republican gathering in
Washington, D.C.31 Like Blankenship, McCutcheon is a generous sponsor
of the Republican Party and an involved leader in party affairs. He serves as
the finance director and member of his county’s Republican Party executive
committee, is the chairman of a party-allied Super PAC, and was the
founding member of the Alabama GOP President’s Council, the top tier of a
dozen highest donors to the Republican Party.32 As McCutcheon’s state
party chairman explained, “[McCutcheon] wanted to make a difference, and
do whatever it takes to help the party achieve its goal. . . . He never
hesitated, whatever we asked him to do.”33
The major parties have mastered the administrative process for
receiving and distributing maximum contributions across many party
recipients in compliance with the aggregate limit and sublimits. The parties
have invested in the development of joint fundraising committees that ease
the administrative challenge of legal compliance. These joint fundraising
committees enable a sympathetic contributor to write a single check up to
the aggregate limit, which the joint fundraising committee then distributes
across individual candidates, party committees, and other PACs in
compliance with all applicable limits.34 Thus the party can relieve the
individual donor of almost all the transaction costs of broad party-based
giving to dozens of party-related recipients. The joint fundraising
committees associated with the major parties’ presidential candidates
collected almost $1 billion together in 2012.35

31
Paul Blumenthal, Next Citizens United? McCutcheon Supreme Court Case Targets Campaign
Contribution Limits, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013, 2:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/07/31/mccutcheon-supreme-court_n_3678555.html.
32
See Kim Chandler, Hoover Businessman at Center of U.S. Supreme Court Case on Contribution
Limits, AL.COM (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/08/hoover_businessman_
at_center_o.html; Shaun McCutcheon, ALA. REPUBLICAN PARTY (May 23, 2012),
http://algop.org/shaun-mccutcheon.
33
See Mary Orndorff Troyan, Alabama GOP Donor Challenges Limits, USA TODAY (Aug. 9,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/08/09/alabama-gop-donor-challenges-limits/
2634671 (quoting Alabama Republican Party Chairman Bill Armistead).
34
See Paul Blumenthal, McCutcheon v. FEC’s Other Threat: Case Could Super-Size Joint
Fundraising Committees, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/10/07/mccutcheon-joint-fundraising-committees_n_4057547.html.
35
See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Joint Fundraising Committees, OPENSECRETS, http://www.
opensecrets.org/pres12/jfc.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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It is precisely the party-based organization of campaign finance at the
highest level of giving that worries reformers about the demise of the
aggregate limit. The partisan invention of the joint fundraising committees,
coupled with high-level donors sympathetic to party centralization of
campaign finance, raises the prospect of individual donors giving up to $3.6
million per federal election cycle in the absence of an aggregate limit.36 This
party-centered character of campaign finance at the aggregate limit explains
why the briefing and advocacy regarding McCutcheon assumes without
explanation that the maximum a high-level donor would contribute, in the
absence of an aggregate limit, is $3.6 million. The calculation of the figure
includes maximum contributions for all federal candidates of one major
party along with maximum contributions to that party’s national and state
committees. Of course, if a high-level donor was inclined to do so, she
could double the $3.6 million figure by giving equally to both major parties,
but no one imagines that a high-level donor would contribute at such levels
to both.
Indeed, high-level contributors at the aggregate limit overwhelmingly
tend to be coupled faithfully to one of the major parties. The Sunlight
Foundation looked at the top 1000 donors for the 2012 federal election, all
of whom gave at least $134,300, and found that only thirty-three of the top
1000 split their money roughly evenly between the major parties.37 In fact,
886 of the 1000 gave at least 90% of their contributions to one party, and
744 gave all their contributions to one party.38 Among contributors who hit
the aggregate sublimit for national party committees, nearly all gave 90% or
more of their party contributions to one major party. 39 What’s more, the
major parties appear heavily reliant on these high-level donors. The
Republican national committees, for instance, took in a third to half of their
2012 contributions from the top 0.01% of the U.S. population who
contributed the most federal campaign money.40
36

See Scott Lemieux, McCutcheon, the Next Victory for the 1 Percent, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 9,
2013), http://prospect.org/article/mccutcheon-next-victory-1-percent.
37
Lee Drutman, The 1000 Donors Most Likely to Benefit from McCutcheon—and What They Are
Most Likely to Do, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Oct. 2, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/
blog/2013/10/02/top1000donors.
38
Id.
39
See Michael Beckel, Supreme Court ‘McCutcheon’ Case Could Aid GOP, CTR. FOR PUBLIC
INTEGRITY (Oct. 7, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/10/07/13510/supreme-courtmccutcheon-case-could-aid-gop (citing a finding by the Center for Responsive Politics that just 2% of
contributors capped by the party aggregate sublimit donated money to a combination of national
committees representing each party). What is more, seventeen of the top twenty political donors during
the first three quarters in 2013 gave exclusively to one party, and all the top twenty donors gave at least
95% of their donations to only one party. Ctr. for Responsive Politics & Sunlight Found., Most Likely to
Exceed: Who’s Poised to Double Down Post-McCutcheon, OPENSECRETS (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/most-likely-to-exceed-whos-poised-to-double-down-postmccutcheon.html.
40
See Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (June 24, 2013,
9:00 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct.
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Without an aggregate limit, the parties’ joint fundraising committees
could conceivably enable individual donors to write one seven-figure check
for their respective party, instead of undertaking the prohibitively difficult
exercise of distributing millions in individual contributions, subject to base
limits, across hundreds of candidates and committees. The major parties,
through their general administrative capacity, enable individual donors to
overcome the practical challenges of campaign finance and maximize the
partisan advantage from their generosity.
III. PARTY-BASED CORRUPTION
The party-centered practice of campaign finance at, or prospectively
beyond, the aggregate limit raises a concern about a slightly different form
of quid pro quo corruption than the usual dyadic conception of corruption
with a particular candidate. High-level donors at the aggregate limit may
effectively transact with the party itself, or at least an important subparty
group, as much as they do with any individual candidate or official. These
donors intend to support the party’s broader efforts beyond any particular
person, and the party cultivates these donors as long-term sponsors of the
party’s or subparty group’s agenda across many campaigns, elections, and
candidates. Joint fundraising and party committees represent the parties
concretely in campaign finance as identifiable legal entities, but a major
party extends beyond its legal entities. It coordinates electoral and
legislative action along myriad political lines that encompass and transcend
those legal entities. Contributors and candidates are likely to be connected
by a major party that manages its relationship with important contributors
and can carefully track and account for the contributors’ generosity and
political interests. As a result, high-level donors who bump up against the
aggregate limit obtain access to party actors’ attention and agendas at the
highest level.
The aggregate limit thus serves a sort of base contribution limit to
party-based giving by these high-level donors. If one forgets the role of the
major parties in campaign finance, it is easy to question why a $2600
contribution limit to one candidate is more corrupting when it follows
similar contributions to other candidates. From a dyadic conception of quid
pro quo corruption at the candidate level, one contribution appears
unrelated to subsequent ones to different recipients. But in high-level
campaign finance among contributors capped by the aggregate limits,
maximum contributions across many recipients often are highly related. An
individual contributor may not even know all the candidates to whom she
has contributed, perhaps through a joint fundraising committee or other
party-related mechanism, but she is likely to believe that the contributions
advance the party’s cause and are recognized by those who run the party
across its many manifestations. The aggregate limit therefore caps this
maximum amount that an individual contributor can donate to the party’s
cause per election cycle and addresses the most extreme worries about the
249
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contributor’s influence with the party as a result of campaign finance
considerations.41
Once the major parties, or at least cognizable subparty groups, are
identified as a transacting counter-party to high-level contributors, the
aggregate limit’s anti-corruption purpose makes far greater sense. Although
a particular candidate may not feel directly indebted to a contributor based
on contributions to other candidates, even a major party is likely to be
indebted and reliant on a contributor who can donate $3.6 million per
election cycle to the party, its committees, and its candidates.42 The
aggregate limit and sublimits suppress any corruptive potential for highlevel campaign finance at a collective party-based level analogous to the
way that base contribution limits suppress the corruptive potential of an
individual contribution at the candidate level. The aggregate limit and
sublimits recognize that the corruptive potential of a campaign contribution
increases with the magnitude of the dollars involved, and therefore bound
that magnitude for the relevant contributor-recipient dyad.
The risk of quid pro quo transactions at the collective party-based level
is not too difficult to imagine. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court in McConnell v.
FEC essentially adopted the view that “[t]he idea that large contributions to
a national party can corrupt or, at the very least, create the appearance of
corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor
implausible.”43 In upholding a prohibition on soft money contributions to
the national party committees, the Court recognized the “special
relationship and unity of interest” between the party and its candidates such
that contributions to the party effectively bought access and influence over
party candidates.44 Although the Roberts Court has distanced itself from this
earlier reasoning,45 the analysis in McConnell and other decisions actually
understates the risk of quid pro quo corruption in high-level party campaign
finance.

41

An obvious result of striking down the aggregate limit would be an increase in fundraising by
candidates and party committees, because at least some high-level donors would contribute more in the
limit’s absence. A portion of this increase would likely be money redirected from Super PACs and other
unconnected committees as a result of a reverse hydraulic redirection of funds in response to
deregulation. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 41–43
(2012). A shift of money away from independent groups, like Super PACs and other unconnected
committees, may be normatively beneficial, as I have suggested in earlier work. See id. at 47–52.
However, for this Essay I focus on the separate question of whether there is a constitutional ground for
the aggregate limit.
42
See Justin Levitt, Symposium: Aggregate Limits and the Fight over Frame, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug.
16, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-aggregate-limits-and-the-fightover-frame (“It’s not hard to imagine leaders’ incentive to give special legislative favors for donors
willing to give maximal support to all of the party’s candidates.”).
43
540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003).
44
See id. at 145.
45
See Kang, supra note 41, at 23–25.
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First, in its campaign finance cases, the Court has traditionally viewed
the major parties formalistically as separate from their candidates and
officeholders. The Court has conceptualized the parties as close but separate
partners of their candidates and officeholders, rather than, as they are,
composed of and led by their candidates and officeholders. Even as the
Court in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
worried about the role of parties as “a funnel from donors to candidates,”
serving as pass-through conduits for money from individuals to
candidates,46 the Court nonetheless earlier in the same litigation rejected the
notion that “the party, in a sense ‘is’ its candidates.”47 The Court ruled, for
instance, that the party committees’ independent expenditures on behalf of
their candidates should be understood as independent from their candidates
“no less than . . . the independent expression of individuals, candidates, or
other political committees.”48 The Court’s formal view of parties as separate
from candidates and officeholders is attributable in part to the fact that the
framing of the cases demanded distinction between the national party
committees’ accounts and candidate accounts as legally, if not politically,
defined entities. However, these party committees were centrally composed
of and led by candidates and officeholders from their respective parties, as
they always are. A conceptualization of formal party entities as removed
and independent from the control of their candidates and officeholders, at
least in high-level campaign finance, is difficult to maintain. At their heart,
the parties are their candidates and officeholders.
Second, flowing from the understanding of the national parties as
separate from candidates and officeholders, the Court has understood the
risk of corruption in party campaign finance as mainly one of access and
circumvention. In Colorado II, the Court upheld restrictions on the relevant
party committees there as necessary to prevent the “circumventing [of]
contribution and coordinated spending limits binding on other political
players.”49 In McConnell, the Court upheld party restrictions to prevent the
“national party committees [from] peddling access to federal candidates and
officeholders . . . .”50 Of course, as mere conduits or support groups for
candidates and officeholders, the parties could do little more than serve as
pass-through conduits for money, or with the benefit of more agency, sell
access by virtue of their special association with their candidates and
officeholders. What a party cannot do, at least when understood as distinct
from its candidates and officeholders, is directly engage in the type of quid
pro quo exchange that the Roberts Court takes as the core concern of
campaign finance law. A party itself, under this view, wields no
46
47
48
49
50
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government authority to sell off. For this reason, the Court’s analysis of the
government’s interest in party-based campaign finance regulation has been
limited to concerns about access to candidates and officeholders, or about
circumvention of campaign finance limits on candidates and officeholders.
As a result of this understanding, the Court has thus far posited that
parties sell and trade only access, not lawmaking authority itself. However,
if political science teaches us anything about modern politics, it is that
officeholders organize themselves into and lead political parties, and that
these parties matter in lawmaking.51 The party enables these sufficiently
like-minded officeholders to act in concert and coordinate their legislative
activity to their mutual benefit. Every party member knows that each vote
or other action dictated by the member’s party will not necessarily offer a
positive individual payoff, but every member also bets that he or she will
benefit over the long run across a full accounting of party votes and
actions.52 In this context, parties are inextricably connected to candidates
and officeholders. These officeholders that constitute the core of the parties
do wield lawmaking authority, and hard-money contributions to the parties
they control and constitute may pose a similar worry of actual or apparent
quid pro quo corruption as contributions to candidates and officeholders
themselves.
The parties are therefore composed at their core of a cartel of allied
lawmakers who can leverage their collective action and economies of scale
in campaign finance. Together these lawmakers develop a campaign finance
apparatus and share major contributors. In this effort, they care not simply
whether they individually receive any particular contribution, but whether a
contribution, wherever it is formally received, benefits the coordinated
party effort of which they are an important part. Again, party lawmakers
know, in the spirit of mutual benefit, that every contribution and
expenditure may not advance the lawmaker’s individual interest, but over
the entirety of activity, they should benefit both individually over the long
run and collectively from the party’s advancement.53 A party-based view of
the aggregate limit best captures the intuition that allowing an individual to
51
See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995) (explaining the essential functions of political parties in
American politics).
52
See generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (2d ed. 2007) (describing parties as just such legislative cartels); ALDRICH,
supra note 51 (same).
53
There is significant pooling of campaign finance money among candidates and parties. Not only
does much of party spending benefit individual candidates, but most congressional officeholders
contribute money to their party committees. For instance, among congresspeople in 2012, 170 of 193
Democrats in the House donated to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee for a total of
$25.5 million, while 211 of 242 House Republicans donated to the National Republican Congressional
Committee for a total of $44.6 million. Russ Choma, Supreme Court and Campaign Finance:
McCutcheon Chapter, OPENSECRETS (Oct. 8, 2013, 9:16 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2013/10/supreme-court-and-campaign-finance-mccutcheon-chapter.html.
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contribute close to $4 million in contributions per election cycle might buy
something more than the sum of all the individual $2600 and $5000
contributions.
As an analytical matter, the risk of corruption is not very different at
the group level from the individual level. What can be exchanged between
two individuals—contributor and candidate—can be exchanged between a
contributor and a group of candidates as well. To illustrate, imagine a club
of lawmakers that decides to sell their votes as a bloc, which increases their
value. The club aggregates certain contributions and shares significant
money to the benefit of the club members, then agrees to vote together as a
group as the club dictates. In this case, members should not care whether
the money is deposited dyadically from contributors to their individual
account, nor will they limit their responsiveness to those contributors who
deposited only in their account. Members will care less where the money
goes if they are secure that the club will pool the money and spend it to
their mutual benefit.54 This arrangement to sell votes certainly would
constitute quid pro quo corruption, and indeed it is sometimes how actual
corruption works.55 The reform worry is that a similar type of coordination,
albeit less explicit, can take place at the party level if campaign finance law
provides the incentive, in the absence of an aggregate limit, of $3.6 million
in contributions from a single individual per election cycle.
This depiction overstates the collectivization of campaign finance
through the parties, but far less so with respect to how party fellowship may
play out for high-level contributors freed from the aggregate limit. Without
a doubt, officeholders and candidates rationally prioritize their personal
fundraising that they control exclusively and differentiate between their
campaign funds and those of even their dearest, most trusted party allies.
But their interest in assisting party allies becomes far more salient with
respect to high-level contributors near the aggregate limit, who have already
maxed out base contributions directly to them. Specifically, such party
officeholders and candidates can receive no more money directly from
those contributors but can benefit further if their contributors are willing to
invest additional money in their favored party colleagues and institutions.56
Once the most generous supporters have maxed out their direct
contributions to party leaders and candidates, those leaders and candidates
are more than happy to have their supporters give even more money
54

See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 453 (“In other words, the party is efficient in generating large sums
to spend and in pinpointing effective ways to spend them.”).
55
See, e.g., Eliza P. Nagel, Note, For the People or Despite the People: The Threat of
Corporations’ Growing Power Through Citizens United and the Demise of the Honest Services Law,
63 RUTGERS L. REV. 725, 741–49 (2011) (discussing the Corrupt Bastards Club and United States v.
Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)).
56
See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 125 (2003) (describing how candidates directed
maxed-out contributors to donate money to their respective national party committees and other
organizations aligned with their party).
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through separate contributions to party committees and fellow candidates.
The aggregate limit arguably targets the ability of only a few hundred very
high-level contributors who can transact in this way at the wholesale level.
Obviously, there are other differences between party-based quid pro
quo and the corruption worry at the level of individual candidates. Partybased quid pro quo corruption implicates no less of the well-recognized
theoretical complications for candidate corruption,57 and actually even
more. At least in theory, an individual candidate may be so reliant on the
sponsorship of one contributor—as the Court seemed to think about Justice
Benjamin’s relationship with Don Blankenship in Caperton—that the risk
of actual or apparent corruption is particularly acute. By contrast, a major
party aggregates a far greater diversity of interests and constituents, which
limits the influence of any specific individual no matter how much money
the individual devotes to the party. Parties by definition are broader, larger
enterprises than individual candidacies, with a deeper contributor base
within which any individual contributor is more likely to be subsumed. It is
harder to corrupt even an important subparty group than an individual
candidate, both in actuality and appearance.
Party-based quid pro quo corruption also presents greater problems of
proof. Inference of a causal relationship between campaign finance
contributions and legislative activity by an individual candidate is always
difficult. It is even more difficult to infer corruption for a group of allied
candidates. The relationship between the aggregation of money across many
candidates and party committees and the legislative behavior of a large
group of officeholders is difficult to sort out when the quid pro quo
exchanges, at least in theory, occur on an unindividuated basis with many
players.
Nonetheless, these complications with group-level corruption raise
matters for regulatory calibration rather than rendering regulation
categorically unconstitutional. Although group-level corruption is as
plausible in theory as individual-level corruption, it is harder to achieve
across multiple candidates in practice and justifies this lighter regulatory
touch as a result. For this reason, the aggregate limit must be set at a very
high dollar ceiling to affect only those contributors whose donations would
be large enough to motivate their recipients into overcoming the collective
action challenges of group-level corruption. In other words, group-level
corruption is admittedly less likely in practice than individual-level
corruption dollar-for-dollar and demands a much higher threshold before
regulation. But this adjustment speaks to regulatory calibration, not the
theoretical justifiability of any regulation at all. And it deserves mention
57
See generally Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996) (challenging the empirical and normative
premises of campaign finance reform); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech,
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997) (outlining inconsistencies in the conception of quid pro quo
corruption).
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that group-level corruption presents potentially far higher payoffs for the
contributor when it is achieved. A group of candidates and officeholders
can offer more attractive quids than they can individually, and thus the
regulatory calibration should offset any improbability by the greater
potential value of group-level corruption.
Of course, it goes way too far to argue that parties are little more than
structures for such coordination between officeholders and their
contributors, and that is not at all my claim. As I have argued previously,
parties are immensely valuable institutions that organize and advance the
ideological policy commitments of their various constituents, from
officeholders at the top to average voters at the bottom. 58 However, the
aggregate limit plausibly suppresses the ability of party-based groups to
engage in actual and apparent quid pro quo exchanges with the few
contributors who have the means and potential interest in these transactions.
Not many individuals wish to donate almost $4 million for a federal
election cycle, but the aggregate limit restricts the ability of contributors to
wield that sort of leverage through the major parties.
CONCLUSION
Defenders of the aggregate limit style it, consistent with what they
view as the demands of First Amendment law, as a check against
circumvention of base contribution limits. Along these lines, at oral
argument in McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts sought a solution that
served the same anti-circumvention goal without also preventing a
contributor from contributing to as many candidates as desired.59 He seemed
to contemplate the possibility of striking down the aggregate sublimit on
candidate contributions while upholding the aggregate sublimits on party
committees and other PACs. If party committees and other PACs are the
most likely conduits for circumvention, then a contributor might struggle to
circumvent the base limits but still remain free to support all the candidates
the contributor wants to support.
A problem with this tailored judicial response is that it might not
realistically address the risk of party-based, group-level corruption. Anticircumvention is only one plausible goal of the aggregate limit and too
narrowly frames the only relevant relationship in campaign finance as
between the contributor and a single candidate. It fails to account for the
fact that, at least at the federal level, nearly every candidate and high-level
contributor operates within a highly partisan campaign finance ecosystem
within which the major parties matter a great deal. A high-level
contributor—who contributes heavily to one party and its candidates at the
58

See Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131
(2005).
59
See McCutcheon Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 14–15, 29–30, 47–48.
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aggregate limit, and beyond it in its absence—effectively may transact not
only with individual candidates, but with their party and party-based allies.
Both the aggregate limit and base contribution limits plausibly address the
risk of corruption by limiting the maximum amount involved in the
campaign finance relationship for the relevant dyad. 60

60
This Essay argues that the aggregate limit is best understood practically as a party-based
contribution limit, but a useful legislative amendment would be to make the aggregate limit more
explicitly a party-based one by capping not simply the total amount contributed, but the total amount
contributed to a single party’s candidates and committees. Such a party-based aggregate limit would
allow further contributions to other parties’ candidates and committees, and as a result, allow a greater
degree of individual spending and discretion while serving the same purpose. Thanks to Nathan Brenner
for this suggestion.
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